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## Editorial

# Freedom as an Aim of Education

**Zuzana Svobodová**

Dear readers of the journal *Theology and Philosophy of Education*,

The title of this editorial shows what could be seen as a common topic for all of the articles published in this second issue. However, our journal for the theology of education and philosophy of education is too young to publish monothematic issues. On the contrary, for our authors, we want to offer the freest possible environment in which they can create and publish articles. This medium (in all meanings of the word) seeks to point out that freedom is not only an aim but also a way how to live humanely. We are not free in many aspects. We can see illnesses, wars, barriers, obstacles or impediments all around us. Nevertheless, or precisely because of this, we long for freedom, and we try to seek freedom. We hope, believe or know about the possibility of changing unfree situations and overcoming these barriers. In all epochs, real educators have been people who are helping others to find more freedom. For Christians, Jesus is the Educator, as, for example, Clement of Alexandria clearly described in his hermeneutics of the Biblical texts, regarding God as the one and only Teacher. In this perspective, we cannot use complete freedom in our everyday life here and now. However, we could and we should live as human beings, humanly. Living humanly means to live with openness to others, with friendship, love, acceptance, and not with violence. Again, real educators know about this openness necessary for the possibility of starting education. This openness is crucial for the existence of human society and participation in human culture. The word culture has its root in the Latin *cultura* (care). Cicero by translating the Greek words *epimeleia peri tes psyches* (ἐπιμέλεια περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς) with the Latin words *cultura animi* (care of the soul, care for the soul, “the culture of the mind” – Cicero 1872, 342) knew that this care (ἐπιμέλεια, *epimeleia*) was the unique experience of pupils or disciples with Socrates as a true philosopher at the agora in Athens (Cic. Tusc. 2.13): Socrates cared not for himself, but he cared for his soul (ψυχή) and for their souls, by searching for t/Truth (ἀλήθεια), and not only a probability, rightness, correctness (ὀρθότης) or actual facticity. Therefore, his education went over or behind the present unfree situation to freedom. The Latin word *educatio* has this in the prefix “e” from “ex” (from) in its root. The difference between the Latin verbs *ducere* and *educere* is tiny but essential in the aim and way of acting and behaving. Feeling more freedom is described by the second of the verbs; the experience of free human life was given by or through education.

Therefore, an educated person can distinguish between the important and unimportant in his knowledge and his life, as David Rybák explains in the first article of this issue. The main goal

of this article is to clarify the connection and unity of educational disciplines in the Platonic curriculum that one could see in the so-called allegory of the cave. This issue begins with this article because this return to Plato means, according to David Rybák, *initiating the question of the meaning of education*. This *initium* (beginning) was and still is (has been) a reason for establishing our journal. Education situated in an ethical context springing from the “face to face” relation, as a novel view outlined by Levinas, is described by James Mensch in the second article of this issue. How inspiration for education through reading could be the first medieval didactics, *The Didascalicon*, written by Hugh of St Victor, is explored by Rastislav Nemeč in his article about reading as a creative process. There must be the ‘unspoken’ beyond all discussion between teacher and pupil and as such this ‘unspoken’ could and should be seen, or, in this case, better: listened. The cruciality of such mutual humble listening, especially important in musical education, but essential for all dialogues, is expressed by Michael Pinkas in his article *Tempting of Speech in Music Education: Reflections on Thomas Mann’s Doktor Faustus*. What we seek by longing for love is considered by Miriam Prokešová in her *Outline of the Philosophical Concept of the Child and the “Child in us”*, where she explains her own view on the child and childhood from seven perspectives which originate in her research and extensive study of various concepts of the child and childhood in literature and philosophy. In the last reviewed article of the presented issue, Mária Spišiaková reflects on death as a part of education at different levels in her article *Why Death Should Be a Topic for Education*.

A short but dense translation from the work of the Czech philosopher of education Radim Palouš is offered to our respective readers as an invitation to TAPE, to bind and connect different perspectives of education. With wishes for open seeing and listening that have a possibility of becoming the intention of attention and bring us closer to freedom,

Zuzana Svobodová

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# Platonic Curriculum and the Allegory of the Cave

David Rybák

## Abstract

The following paper attempts to show and take into account in basic terms the unity and direction of the movement of education as presented in Plato's *Republic*. We show that education, according to Plato, essentially involves a claim to knowledge in the sense of understanding what is valid regardless of space and time and acting on the basis of norming oneself by this understanding. Then, namely, in the sense of this distinction, an educated person is one who is able to distinguish the important and the unimportant in his knowledge and in his life.

## Keywords

Idea; Plato; education; philosophy of education; theory; Europe

## Introduction

The main goal of the following article is to outline the connection and unity of the educational disciplines that Plato schedules, against the background of his allegory of the cave, presented in the 7th book of Plato's *Republic*. One can argue that Plato's philosophy is more than 2,300 years old, so the effort to update it is at least an anachronism. I tend to agree with this claim, but *this actualization is not my point here*. Plato himself would consider *repetition* of his own thinking to be slave-like. As we shall see, repetition is the lowest form of knowledge for him. Then why is it important to return to Plato? What are we returning to when we return to Plato? Plato is the one who has discovered the Idea of education as a bringing one to the Ideas (to distinguish the Idea in the Platonic sense from the idea in the modern sense – as a content of consciousness, a perception – I write the first with a capital “I”). The return to Plato means the return to the discovery of education as a specific *freedom* that lies in education as a movement towards the humanity of man. This freedom is something that students must be enabled for; insofar as *education regards not only an expert but, more importantly, a human being*. So, the return to Plato here means *initiating the question of the meaning of education*. And finally, I argue that in his Idea of education, Plato considers the specific kind of freedom that involves the transformation of the soul. (Recently, the aspect of education as a transformative experience was emphasized by Liessmann (2017).) This model of education as a metamorphosis of the soul stays in contrast to the model of man as a human resource that is to be provided with pre-defined skill and competences.

## Plato's curriculum

At first, let me briefly summarize the basic moments of the Allegory of the cave. The allegory can be divided into four parts: 1) the situation of those who are imprisoned in the cave; 2) release of one of the prisoners; 3) his ascent from the cave to the sunlit world; 4) his return to the cave and his murder. The cave is an image of our perceptible world. The world outside the cave is an image of the world of Ideas.

It will be important to us that the structure of the whole allegory does not have the character of a mere ascent to the truth, but it forms a circle. We cannot simply ascend to the truth, because truth is not something we can achieve once and for all. But it is possible to enter a certain movement of truth when we enter the difference between the educated and uneducated (cf. Heidegger 1988, 114f.). And movement within this difference is called by Plato education (*paideia*). This movement occurs when we enter into, or rather, we are situated into the abyss between mere opinion and truth. The location in which we are thus situated is called, in our European tradition, the school (*schole*).

In what follows, I would like to indicate the unity of the curriculum Socrates is describing, which is “subjectively” the unity of the movement of the soul to the Idea of the Good that gives Being to all beings. And *the degrees by which the soul ascends concern the degrees of knowledge*.

## 1 Basics of education or basic education

### 1.1 Gymnastics

Let us have a look at the curricular disciplines within Plato's project.

The first discipline is *gymnastics*. Gymnastics belongs to the sphere of growing and perishing (*Resp.* 521e). In the dialogue, it is stated that although gymnastics cultivates the body, it also happens that gymnastics primarily serves to educate the soul (403d, 410c). In the context of the allegory of the cave, gymnastics would belong to the field of imitation and shadows. From the perspective of knowing the truth, gymnastics is founded on *repetition of exercises*. But at the same time, this repetition transcends to the *unity* of the body. In order for the body to function well, it must work as a unity. Exercise includes self-overcoming. And this self-overcoming is the performance not of the body, but of the *soul*. Repetition or imitation has the lowest validity from the point of view of knowledge. Indeed, the image of the thing gives me certain knowledge, but if I believe that the image of the thing is the thing itself, I am a victim of deception.

### 1.2 Music

*Music* is also located within the cave. However, the shift is that music is performed purely for the soul (376e). Performing music brings *unity and grace* (401d) to the soul by bringing *harmony and eurythmy* to it. Music allows the child to experience the specific harmony that transcends particular tones. And it is constitutive for an educated person as a free being that he is able to perceive beauty and grace for himself (and not slavishly for some profit or lust). It is necessary to say that the title “music” (*musike*) does not mean only music, but refers to the

Muses, the daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne. Plato explicitly states that music also includes drawing, stylistics, or myths. But like gymnastics, music also has limits that must be exceeded. *It lacks the ability to give rational reasons (logoi)* (411d).

Thus, the partners in the dialogue come to the conclusion that music cannot be the education of the soul as a whole. Instead, music and gymnastics form the *strings of the soul* (411e). And these strings should be brought up educationally. *The sense of harmony is not yet an understanding of harmony*. Gymnastics and music belong to the realm of changing being (i.e., into the cave), they are not able to draw the soul towards Being and truth (521d).

## 2 Exiting the cave

When the prisoner is forced out of the cave, he must first get his eyes used to daylight. What connection to education is expressed in this picture? The sun, which is never visible from within the cave, refers to the Idea of the Good that makes it possible that things appear as true in its light. The difficulty of learning to think with regard to the truth is experienced by the student at the university when entering the field of theoretical knowledge. In common experience with particular things, it suffices to open your eyes and see these tables, chairs, and so on in front of you. You do not have to understand why they are, you just see them in their contingency. On the other hand, in the field of theoretical knowledge, everything creates the necessary system of connections. And this is one of the hardest tasks connected to the ability to think with regard to this necessity. With this point in mind, we can interpret the context of our allegory. Outside the cave, the prisoner cannot see things themselves. He is blinded by the sunlight. So he observes shadows of things and later on the images on water surfaces. Only after some time is he able to look at things themselves (on the role of time, or rather timing, in education, cf. Svobodová 2013). The image of a water *surface* seems to confirm the interpretation that the difference between shadows and mirroring images and things themselves corresponds to the difference between arithmetic and geometry on the one hand and astronomy and harmony of the other (Fleischer 1970, 493). It is necessary to take into account that within the structural analogy the daylight represents the light of truth, which makes it possible not only to perceive by senses but also to *think of the necessary relationships*.

## 3 Education as such

### 3.1 Arithmetic

So, where does the prisoner go from the cave, when we interpret the allegory in the context of curriculum? First, it is an arithmetic world and a geometric world.

With *arithmetic*, we are already crossing the boundary between the sensory field and the field of thinking. We need to recall Pythagorean inspiration (Losin 1997, 61), according to which numbers do not mean mere algebraic symbols, but numbers form the world itself, including its sensory components. As stated in the dialogue, mathematics is not reduced to mere calculating (525b-c). The educational value of mathematics lies in the fact that it directs the soul towards a permanent and unchanging being. Thus, it makes it easier for the soul not to range along the realm of sensible and variable, but to learn to look into the realm of the intelligible (525c). At

the same time, however, Plato criticizes the Pythagoreans. The criticism is that Pythagorean mathematicians rely on the unity of numbers as an assumption they no longer question (525e-526a). There is a difference between operating with assumptions (“it is given”) and examining the assumptions as such and trying to understand them (cf. also 510a-511b).

### 3.2 Geometry

When we move on to *geometry*, its value is underlined by the fact that above the entrance to Plato’s Academy was the inscription: “No one enters who does not know geometry” (or, taking into account Plato’s specific humour: “who is not geometrical”). Although the geometer may be using visible figures and symbols, he is not focused on them in his thinking, but rather using the visible figures, he thinks of intelligible (immutable) essential relations. These essential relations do not apply contingently in some place or time (for instance, only on Monday), but they are true every time and everywhere. As Plato puts it, geometry recognizes an eternal being (527b).

### 3.3 Astronomy

Why, according to Plato, is *astronomy* higher than geometry? Does not astronomy mean a return to the sensory world of planets and stars? In the dialogue, it is stated that “astronomy ought to be taught contrary to the present fashion” (529c). And this is precisely because contemporary (that means 4<sup>th</sup> century BC) teaching of astronomy remains with visible bodies and their imperfect orbits. That means that it is not understood that the orbits performed by celestial bodies are themselves only a reflection of true speed and slowness “in true numbers” (529d). According to Plato, what is important in astronomy are the ideal conditions and non-perceptible movements of bodies in the sky. Astronomy is for Plato, the knowledge of idealized orbits. Astronomy adds to geometry a fourth dimension of velocity.

### 3.4 Harmony

*Harmony*, as a discipline related to “harmonious motion in music” (530d), also involves sensory perception that needs to be purified by idealization. Harmony is not interested in perceived chords and tones (531a), but in the harmonic numbers themselves. It is worth mentioning that harmony is retroactively related to gymnastics and music: it is a difference if I have a sense for grace and good music (in the widest sense), and if I can calculate the ratios that are constitutive for these in harmony and grace.

In the field of perception, we are bound to contingent place and time. Therefore, the truth appears only to a limited extent in this field. For example, it is true that now I am standing here. But when I take a step forward, this truth ceases to exist. In contrast, mathematical knowledge is not tied to place and time. In idealized knowledge or, as Plato puts it, purified knowledge that purifies also the soul (527d-e), we are *freed from the particular perspective “here and now”*. In Greek, *mathema* is what is teachable. And the teachable is what is true *by necessity*. What is true in mathematics ( $2+2=4$ ) is not true only now and here or only for someone, but it is true



for every reasonable being. Purifying the soul also means freeing oneself from the shackles of one's own particular perspective.

Of pedagogical importance is the emphasis that gymnastics, music, and mathematics are not to be learned by force and in a slavish way, but in the form of play. Play does not mean infotainment, the entertainment into which education is often turned today. The point is that the understanding of the necessity that constitutes knowledge is not possible through force or slavish repetition, but only through one's own free insight. All disciplines should form the synoptic system so that the educated one can understand their kinship and unity (537b-c). That is, the student should understand what is universal in all disciplines despite their differences. Plato speaks of the *synopsis*, literally, of what is "seen together", with regard to the general view of the whole. Such a synopsis gives unity to any knowledge. The requirement of wholeness constitutes an important issue in our epoch of hyperspecialization. In synopsis, we no longer have mere relations, but relations between relations, correlations. Correlation is a specific kind of relation where one pole cannot exist without the other (e.g., father-son, valley-top). The synopsis no longer compares the particulars and their relations, but the wholes and their necessary connections.

## 4 The acme of education

### 4.1 Dialectics

Synopsis is the ability of comparison that enables *dialectical understanding* (537c). Apart from the differences in content, it is something that is universal in all disciplines, passing through them and through all knowledge. To be able to understand means to be able to see through the obvious of what is common to all and without which the obvious phenomena would not show at all. To put it somewhat paradoxically, to understand means seeing the unity obviously concealed behind phenomena. This concealed unity is by Plato thought of as Idea. A dialectician is therefore no longer focused on what appears, his view is turned to things themselves, to Ideas.

We can better understand the importance of dialectical understanding when we consider the variability of particular perceptible things. It is this variability that prevents us from understanding their contradictory ontological status. This contradictory status lies in the fact that sensible things are constantly changing, arising, and disappearing. The way of being of this perceived table is occurring in a way that the table is constantly changing over time. Even if we do not perceive this changing, we understand that sooner or later the table ceases to exist and that it will have perished. And also the specific predicates of the table, its brownness, etc., contradict predicates of other tables that are black, white, etc. In contrast, the *Idea* of the table is not itself brown, black, etc. We can only see it with our minds when we focus on the universal that all tables have in common, or more precisely, what is numerically identical in all tables. Thanks to this character, which is present in all possible tables that are numerically identical, the table is a table, and not something else. And again, this is called by Plato: Idea. The starting question that initiates one to aim his mental eyes towards the Idea is: "WHAT is X?". It is precisely this question that puts a cave prisoner in a helpless situation (cf. 515d).

Dialectics is not a discipline. This means that it cannot be learned. To connect the first and the last, let us say that dialectics is the gymnastics of the soul. There is no doctrine that could create a wise man. However, it is possible to train the mind by dealing with the pure measures (Ideas) by which we orient ourselves in our experience.

By taking the whole into account, we are no longer trapped in contingencies but turned to what is necessarily true. Let us quote Aristotle's definition of knowledge: "We all conceive that a thing which we know scientifically cannot vary ... An object of Scientific Knowledge, therefore, exists of necessity." (*Eth. Nic.* 1139b) It is this necessity that Platonic education is aimed at. The educated knows about this necessity. He knows that he is being bound (cf. *zygon* in *Resp.* 507e) by this necessity that forces nothing, and yet it is true no matter what anyone wants or does not want.

### Conclusion

So what is at stake in education is the conversion (518d) of the soul to unity, to true things (519a-b). What gives the whole educative motion its unity? The point of individual disciplines is not to gain individual skills or competences, but to self-knowledge and self-transformation of the soul. Education in the Platonic sense of the care for the soul is the caring for the universality, for the whole. But, as much as we do not possess the truth, we do not possess the whole. We must always carry out the movement of education always again. So the prisoner returns to the cave. Education is not a one-way trip to wisdom. Education is a circle (*periodos*) of questioning, and the hardest task is to begin with it always again (cf. Heidegger 1957: 15–17).

Of course, the question whether the freedom of humanity is not lost when we consider a human being as a human resource is still open.

We *are* in this question.

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# Levinas on Teaching

James Mensch

## Abstract

The teaching relation has always been a puzzle. Some take education as the passing on and acquisition of information. They regard the lecture format as crucial. Others see it in terms of developing the reasoning ability of students. In seminars and conversations, they strive to have their students reflect and learn to “think for themselves”. Their goal is a rational individual capable of insight. Levinas, the French Philosopher, who famously positioned ethics as first philosophy, i.e., as determinative of how we think of ourselves and our world, advances a novel view, one springing from the “face to face” relation. In this article, we explore how his understanding of this relation leads to his situating education in an ethical context.

## Keywords

Levinas; education; alterity; the face to face relation; embodiment

The teaching relation is crucial to society, and has assumed various forms throughout history – both formal and informal. Without it, a society cannot pass on its acquired knowledge, still less can it add to what it preserves. Given its importance, how are we to understand it? What form should it ideally take? Theories of education abound. Some take education as the passing on and acquisition of information. They regard the lecture format as crucial. Others see it in terms of developing the reasoning ability of students. In seminars and conversations, they strive to have their students reflect and learn to “think for themselves”. Their goal is a rational individual capable of insight. Levinas, as we shall see, takes a novel position, one based on his criticism of the tradition in which these approaches arise. As a philosopher who takes ethics as “first philosophy”,<sup>1</sup> his approach situates education within an ethical context.

## The Classical Models of Educational Practice

Levinas’s position can be approached by contrasting it with two classical views of education. The first, which stems from Plato’s *Meno*, emphasizes the autonomy of the learner. It contains the well-known passage where Socrates shows a slave boy how to produce a square with an area double the size of an original one. As Socrates emphasizes, he does not impart information to the boy, but only asks him questions (*Meno* 84d). Such questions make him “recollect” the answer. From the diagrams drawn, the boy sees that the required square must be one constructed on the diagonal of the original square. Socrates claims that, since the boy has received no

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<sup>1</sup> In Levinas’s words: “Morality is not a branch of philosophy, but first philosophy” (Levinas 1969, 304).

information from him, this demonstration shows that the soul is immortal and “has seen all things” and “there is nothing which it has not learned.” Consequently, “it can recollect the things it knew before.” (*Meno* 81d) This, he asserts, is what the slave boy does in coming to the right answer. Implicit here is the contention that there is a certain identity between the knower and the known in recollection. As Plato puts this, when the soul grasps the ideas or the forms of things, “it passes into the realm of what is pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging, and, being akin to this, it always stays with it ...; it ceases to stray and remains in the same state as it is in touch with things of the same kind.” (*Phaedo* 79d) This realm of “the pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging” is that of the self-identical forms or ideas. The soul, in knowing these, becomes like them. In other words, I am, at the moment of knowing, simply the insight that I am presently having. Thus, as the knower of the relation of square and its double in size, I am just like everyone else who knows this relation. In the moment of that insight, I am timeless; I have an ideal being just like the relation that I am knowing. This identity of the knower and the known is such that all I have to do is look within myself, i.e., recollect, to grasp the known. In Levinas’s terms, both knower and known are ultimately the “same”. He writes, “Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other [the known] to the same ... This primacy of the same was Socrates’ teaching: to receive nothing of the Other but what is in me.” (1969, 43)

Aristotle’s view of education differs sharply from this. Yet, it too embraces the “primacy of the same”. While for Plato teaching is the questioning that prompts the student to look within himself, for Aristotle teaching is informing. Our modern view, which sees teaching as imparting information, is a reflection of this view.<sup>2</sup> Aristotle bases his position on a very different account of the forms or ideas. Rather than existing in a separate, timeless realm, the forms are “at work” in the material world. They inform matter, making it into a specific something. Thus, the form of humanity, at work within the womb of the mother, informs the matter she provides to produce a human being. Humans, when mature, repeat this process when they mate. Doing so, they pass on the form that they received from their parents.<sup>3</sup> This process occurs not just throughout the natural world, it is also present in most human activities. Thus, in carpentry, the form, which is present in the mind of the carpenter as his conception of what he wants to build, informs his actions of shaping the wood to produce the final product. The same paradigm occurs in the relation of the teacher to the learner as she imparts her ideas to the latter. Here, the teacher is the informing agent and the student is the material she works on. This does not mean that the teacher is independent of the student. She cannot function as a teacher without him. Similarly, he cannot function as learner without her. As Aristotle writes, “there is a single functioning (*energeia* – ἐνέργεια) of both alike.”<sup>4</sup> This means that the teacher and the student must “work” together. Their “being at work”, their actuality or functioning, is, in this instance, one. Crucial to this position is Aristotle’s conception of being as functioning or “at workness” – the literal

<sup>2</sup> The modern version of Plato’s position is the seminar that begins with an opening question.

<sup>3</sup> Readers will recognize this as a distant version of the modern view of DNA, where the strands of the DNA inform or guide the process of the development of the embryo.

<sup>4</sup> *Physics* 202a, lines 16–20, my translation.

meaning of *energeia*. This signifies that *being exists where it is at work*. In other words, a being, as functioning, exists where it functions. Thus, Aristotle asserts that “the functioning of the sensible object” is “in the sensing subject”.<sup>5</sup> Functioning, it exists as sensible in the seeing subject. Similarly, the teacher *qua* teacher is “in the one taught”.<sup>6</sup> Her actuality is one with the learner’s. Once again, we encounter the “primacy of the same”. For Plato, “the same” was the knower’s identity with the ideal forms. For him, these forms represent, in their unchanging conceptual identity, the very being of “to be”.<sup>7</sup> They are the forms that impose stability on our changing world. For Aristotle, “the same” is the functioning of such forms. Since being *qua* being is not differentiated, being as functioning or actualization is ultimately one.

### The Plurality of Embodiment

Levinas’s goal is to overturn this paradigm. It is, as he writes in *Totality and Infinity*, to “oppose the ancient privilege of unity which is affirmed from Parmenides to Spinoza and Hegel.” (1969, 102) The privilege of unity is that of “the same”. It expresses itself in the attempt to grasp what is common in different things, thus gaining a “total”, comprehensive view of them. Levinas’s work, by contrast, emphasizes plurality over unity and, as part of this, difference over identity. What he wants, he writes, is a relation with the Other “that does not result in a divine or human totality”, a relation that, in fact, breaks up all totalizations (1969, 52). The insight here is close to that of Hannah Arendt, whose work is shaped by the fact that it is not man [the universal], “but men that inhabit the earth” (1958, 234). For both philosophers, the plurality of humanity points to the interiority that makes each of us something more than an instance of a species. Both emphasize the miracle of “natality”—i.e., the fact that the world is born anew in each child in the sense that a child’s birth is the recommencement of the world’s presence.<sup>8</sup> Levinas finds the basis for this plurality in our embodiment. In a certain sense, his position is an extension of Heidegger’s stress on the fact that no one can die for you, i.e., that each person must die his own death. For Heidegger this implies that death “individualizes Dasein down to itself” (1968, 263). It points to our existential solitude. For Levinas, however, such individualization has a broader basis than death. It is grounded in the privacy of our organic functioning. Thus, just as no one can die for you, so no one can eat for you, sleep for you,

<sup>5</sup> *De Anima* 426a, line 10, my translation.

<sup>6</sup> *Physics* 202b, line 8, my translation.

<sup>7</sup> According to Plato, “the very being of to be [αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ... τοῦ εἶναι] ... is to be always the same with itself” [ἀεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταῦτά].” As Plato explains, this is to be “unchanging” and, thus, to remain self-identical. The ideas “beauty itself, equality itself, and every itself” are called “being” – τὸ ὄν – because they “do not admit of any change whatsoever” (*Phaedo* 78d, my translation). Plato’s position follows from an analysis of what change means. Its fundamental intuition is that change is always a change of something. This something is an underlying self-identity. The consequence is that real loss of self-identity is not change. It is rather annihilation pure and simple of the individual.

<sup>8</sup> For Arendt, the genuinely new is made possible by natality. In her words: “It is in the nature of beginning that something new is started which cannot be expected from whatever may have happened before.” This newness “is possible only because each man is unique so that with each birth something uniquely new comes into the world” (1958, 177–178). Levinas expresses a similar position in his discussion of fecundity. See *Totality and Infinity*, p. 284.

breathe for you or perform for you any of a host of functions. The functioning of our bodies is non-substitutable, irreplaceable. While someone else can go to the bank for you, no one else can go to the bathroom for you. The uniqueness of a person in his or her interiority comes from the uniqueness of our embodied functioning. When we bite into a fresh peach, we have an interior experience that is not public, not disclosable as there for everyone. The result is an inwardness that “refuses the concept” since there is no plurality of directly experienceable public examples to draw the concept from. As Levinas emphasizes, without this non-conceptual interiority of the I, we cannot have a human plurality. Thus, “when the I is identified with reason ... it loses its very ipseity ... Reason makes human society possible; but a society whose members would merely be reasons would vanish as a society ... Reason has no plural; how could numerous reasons be distinguished?” (1969, 119) Rather than reason, embodiment distinguishes us, which means that “[f]or the I to be means to enjoy something” (1969, 120).

### **Intending the Embodied Other: The Face to Face**

This emphasis on embodiment does not mean that human beings are totally different. We are, after all, members of the same species and have similar bodies with similar senses. Yet, the embodied Other still contains something more than what I can grasp from my own case. As embodied, he necessarily views the world from a different physical standpoint. As a result, his perceptions and memories, which form his “interiority”, remain distinct from mine. The interpretations and actions based on such interiority are correspondingly different. While I, given my past experience, may interpret a given situation one way, I cannot assume that the Other’s grasp of the situation matches my own. To be certain of it, I would have to have access to his past and present experience. His perceptions, memories and the ongoing interpretations that he has formed from these would lie within my purview. But this would mean that his consciousness and my own would merge. The result would be that I would not be grasping another person, but rather myself.<sup>9</sup>

The above can be put in terms of the special way we intend another person. There are, broadly speaking, four possible relations that intentions have to fulfilments. The givenness of what we intend can exactly match our intentions. We can intend to see an object – say, a book on the table – and our perception fulfils our interpretative intentions. Alternately, such givenness can be other than what we intend – as is the case when we are mistaken. Thus, I thought I was seeing a cat crouching under a bush, but on closer inspection, I found it was only a collection of flickering shadows. Another possibility is that such givenness can be less than what we intend. It can, for example, not offer the detail that was part of our intentions. This happens when we mistake a mannequin for a person. Regarding it at a distance, we take it as a salesperson, and expect it to respond to us, but on approaching it, we see that it is only a lifelike representation. Finally, givenness can exceed our intentions. In showing itself, the object presents us with more than what we intended. To intend the object as having such excessive

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<sup>9</sup> As Sartre puts this: “What I must attain is the Other, not as I obtain knowledge of him, but as he obtains knowledge of himself - which is impossible. This would in fact suppose the internal identification of myself with the Other” (Sartre 1966, 317).

presence is, paradoxically, to intend it as exceeding our intentions. Such presence has a peculiar quality. It makes us aware that more is being offered than we can formulate in our intentions. The interpretations based on our previous experience are not sufficient to grasp the sense it embodies. We have to adjust our interpretation and return to it again. In such a return, however, we face the same situation. Yet another return is called for. The “object” that continually demands such a return is, of course, not an inanimate object, but rather a person.

Such insights are behind Levinas’s account of the face to face relation. The face, he writes, at “each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves on me”. Thus, regarding the face of the Other, I can see her eyes, but I cannot see the seeing that occurs through them. Neither can I see the thoughts that prompt her when she faces me. What vision gives me is the “plastic image” of the Other; but, facing her, I never repeat my mistake with the mannequin and confuse this image with reality. The same holds for the conception I have of her. It, too, is never completely adequate. Such thoughts animate Levinas’s definition of a face: “The way in which the Other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the Other in me, we here name [the] face.” (1969, 51) Inattentive readers of Levinas often object that the same holds for the face of an animal. Why, they ask, cannot Levinas’s argument apply, say, to the face of a bat?<sup>10</sup> Such readers miss Levinas’s repeated assertion that the face of the Other is a speaking face. The surpassing of the Other, Levinas writes, “is primordially enacted as conversation.” (1969, 39) Thus, the face does not manifest itself by the “plastic image” it shows to me, rather, it exhibits its surpassing because “it expresses itself” by speaking to me. (1969, 51) There is here a special relation of the saying to the said. The saying – i.e., the actual vocal expression – expresses itself in what is said. But with the expression of the said, the conversation does not necessarily stop. Rather the Other can amend or add to it by a new saying. Thus, as Levinas writes, “To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at each instant he overflows the idea [that] a thought would carry away from it.” (1969, 51) This overflowing is a new saying. It is the Other’s excessive presence as manifested by his exceeding the thought that he has just verbally presented by adding to it.

The root of the Other’s ability to continually surpass what he presents to me involves his embodiment. Because of the uniqueness of our embodiment, each of us brings the world to presence in a unique way. The same holds for the actions that respond to this presence, actions by which we alter or shape what we presently experience. Now, when we express what we experience, we necessarily employ the common concepts of our language. Were such concepts sufficient, the alterity of the Other could be overcome. The reasoning that joins concepts would be sufficient. But, as we cited Levinas, “a society whose members would merely be reasons would vanish as a society.” It would not be a plurality, but a conceptual unity. Our embodiment, however, prevents this. What we face here is, in fact, an inescapable duality. The face is a *speaking face* and, thus, expresses itself in the common concepts of our language. But it is also an *embodied face*, the face of a person with his unique interiority. The latter inevitably surpasses – involves a surplus with regard to – such common concepts. In Levinas’s terms, the “said” that

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<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Todd 1997, 143.



the Other expresses is always “too late”. Her interiority has already moved on requiring a new “saying”. Such “saying” transcends the said. It represents the new, which I must appropriate.

### Teaching and Ethics

The student–teacher relationship that is based on this view of human interaction necessarily differs from the classical models presented by Plato and Aristotle. The student for Levinas is not an autonomous learner who needs only to be questioned to recollect what is within him. Neither is he matter – i.e., a passive material – waiting to be informed by the teacher. Both these positions, we emphasised, privilege unity or “the same”. For Levinas, however, the student’s relation to the teacher involves alterity. Their relation is one of conversation. Levinas writes, in this regard, to “approach the Other in conversation” is “to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I.”<sup>11</sup> To be taught involves just such reception from the Other of what one cannot get on one’s own. As Levinas continues: “But this also means: to be taught ... inasmuch as it is welcomed, this conversation is a teaching. Teaching ... comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain.” (1969, 50)

It is in this context that Levinas claims: “The relation with the Other, or Conversation, is ... an ethical relation.” (1969, 50) It is ethical insofar as the Other, in teaching us, calls us into question. She offers a perspective, a view, that is different from our own. When we welcome this, we are prompted to question our own views. We ask why we should maintain our previous conceptions rather than the ones the teacher offers us. There is here, according to Levinas, an interruption of our egotism, a break in our viewing things only from our private standpoint. Experiencing this, we stand out from ourselves. We reflect on ourselves and our beliefs.<sup>12</sup> Called into question, we are called to judge our opinions and the conduct that springs from them. As for our relation to the teacher, it involves both waiting and patience. Aware that the teacher offers us what we cannot get on our own, we have to wait for her and the text she guides us through to speak to us.

This patience involves our not thrusting our views forward, but rather attending to what her teaching offers us. As the French philosopher, Simone Weil, writes of school studies: “All wrong translations, all absurdities in geometry problems, all clumsiness of style, and all faulty connection of ideas in compositions and essays, all such things are due to the fact that thought has seized upon some idea too hastily, and being thus prematurely blocked, is not open to the truth.” (1979, 35) The cure for this is attention. “Attention”, she writes, “consists of suspending

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<sup>11</sup> Such reception, Levinas continues, “means exactly: to have the idea of infinity.” “Infinity”, as Levinas uses the term, does not signify an infinite totality. It rather indicates an inability to be limited or bounded. Thus, the Other is infinite in the sense that there is always an excess, an addition that, like a new *saying*, adds to our conception of him. No total understanding of the person is, therefore, possible.

<sup>12</sup> This ability to stand out from ourselves gives us the distancing that Sartre sees as essential to freedom. Sartre writes in this regard, “For man to put a particular existent out of circuit is to put himself out of circuit in relation to the existent. In this case he is not subject to it; he is out of reach; it cannot act on him, for he has retired *beyond a nothingness*. Descartes, following the Stoics, has given a name to this possibility, which human reality has, to secrete a nothingness which isolates it – it is *freedom* (Sartre 1966, 60). What secretes this nothingness, for Levinas, is the Other that we welcome in conversation.

our thought, leaving it detached, empty, and ready to be penetrated by the object.” (1979, 35) The ethical import of such attention to the Other is our openness to the suffering and vulnerability of Others. Weil puts this in terms of a medieval legend. She writes, “In the first legend of the Grail, it is said that the Grail (the miraculous vessel that satisfies all hunger by virtue of the consecrated Host) belongs to the first comer who asks the guardian of the vessel, a king three-quarters paralyzed by the most painful wound, ‘What are you going through?’” (1979, 36) The Grail belongs to the person who has the patience to attend to the answer. For Levinas, as for Weil, ethics begins with such openness, such attending to the Other. For both, there is an intimate connection between education and ethics.

### Note

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# Reading as a Creative Process in the Pedagogy of Hugh of St Victor

**Rastislav Nemeč**

## Abstract

The pedagogical work of the Victorines represents not only one of the greatest contributions to the history of education in medieval times, but it is also a new and inspirational instrument that combines the reading of classic works with the reading of the Holy Scripture. The topic of this article is to describe the basic lines of pedagogical thinking of one of the doyens of medieval pedagogy – Hugh of St Victor (†1141) – which he introduced in his first medieval didactics, *The Didascalicon*. The work focuses on the topic of reading, which is broadly thematised in the text. It looks at it through the prism of metaphors used by Hugh to explain reading.

## Keywords

Hugh of St Victor; medieval reading; John of Salisbury; methods of reading

## Introduction

Hugh of St Victor's twelfth-century treatise *Didascalicon, de studio legendi* outlines an ambitious educational philosophy aimed at helping to restore the original integrity humans possessed in their souls and bodies before the Fall. Indeed, it is more accurate to say that Hugh has an ambitious view of philosophical education, since he regards the discipline of philosophy as crucial to the restoration of human nature (Dillard 2014, 203). The aim of this article is to describe some of his pedagogical methods that lead to the formation of man and stimulate his/her creative growth. Because of limited space, the stress will be put only on two of them. First, it will only consider two alternative pedagogical theories in the Middle Ages presented by Hugh and John of Salisbury, with attention drawn to their common and diverse elements. This will be followed by an exploration of the role and characteristics of reading as the arduous activity of a searching man. The conclusion will be focused on an introduction of two methods mentioned by Hugh in the context of reading and a brief description of them. These methods outline how important it is also nowadays to cultivate slow, deep reading face to face with currently established trends.

### 1. Two pedagogical works – Hugh of St Victor and John of Salisbury

Two pedagogical works were written at about the same time in Paris. One of them was written by Hugh of St Victor in the Abbey of St Victor, one of three most significant monastical schools of the 12<sup>th</sup> century (along with St Genevieve and Notre Dame). According to I. Illich, Hugh's pedagogical work *Didascalicon* (written about 1127) represents such an intellectual revolution

that it is possible to talk about the era “before Hugh and after Hugh”. The second pedagogical work was written a few years later by John of Salisbury. Although he was of English descent, he studied in Paris. His work *Metalogicon* (1159) represents an equivalent of Hugh’s pedagogical work, but the aim is slightly different – political involvement. This article briefly outlines the differences between the two works.

*Didascalicon* is, first and foremost, a philosophical text about how to read. There are two things, Hugh tells us in his preface, by which a person “advances in knowledge... reading and meditation” (Hugh 2012, 44). The *Didascalicon* deals only with reading, but its author wants to emphasise that education does not consist of study alone; reading begins, but by no means completes, a process of understanding and learning. *Didascalicon*’s goal, however, is to ensure that the first step is taken properly. “Of all things to be eagerly desired, the first is that Wisdom, in which the Form of the perfect good stands fixed...” (Hugh 2012, 82)

For Hugh, this Wisdom is ultimately Christ, though he speaks about it here as an inner illumination, the one that reveals to people what they truly are. What one must do above all is follow the classic doctrine: Know thyself. “It is written on the tripod of Apollo: gnothi seauton, that is, ‘know yourself,’ because without a doubt if the human person had not forgotten his own origin he would realise to what extent every mutable thing is nothing...” (Hugh 2012, 83).

*Didascalicon* therefore proposes a programme of spiritual restoration for fallen man – *reparatio hominis*: “we are restored, however, through learning, so that we may again know our nature and so that we might learn not to seek outside ourselves what we can find within” (Hugh 2012, 84).

Compared to Hugh’s *Didascalicon*, *Metalogicon* is certainly more focused in (politically motivated) scope – it treats only the components of logic or the trivium: grammar, rhetoric and dialectic. John does not disagree with Hugh’s basic principle regarding the pedagogical goal of wisdom. One of John’s overriding concerns involves the relationship of eloquence to wisdom and, like Hugh, he has an Augustinian precedent in *De Doctrina Christiana*. While Hugh drew primarily upon the themes of the first three books of that work, John’s interest in the concrete uses of the verbal arts is the focus of Book IV. Augustine recognises that rhetoric (e.g. eloquence) has a purpose in promoting the truth when used well, but he worries about its misuses (Augustine 1995, 119). Book IV, where he discusses how to present Scripture’s meanings to others, reveals that underlying ambiguity. John thus focuses on the specific uses of eloquence<sup>1</sup> rather than mastery of its rules (p. 201), but he is wary of the study or use of any rhetoric detached from a scriptural context (Salisbury 1971, 26). This, for him, is eloquence without wisdom (Fitzgerald 2010, 581). In its stated purpose, *Metalogicon* is clearly Victorine in spirit – much as Hugh insists on the significance of even the lowest arts (grammar, dialectic, rhetoric) for the philosophical quest, so does John defend the very foundations of education (Fitzgerald 2010, 580). So what is the difference between their bases and aims?

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<sup>1</sup> *Metalogicon* Book I., chapter 7, p. 27: “He who despises such a great boon [as eloquence] is clearly in error; while he who appreciates, or rather pretends to appreciate it, without actually cultivating it, is grossly negligent and on the brink of insanity”.

If Hugh's pedagogical foundation was to be concisely defined, the motto "education means formation, the shaping of the integral personality under the influence of Wisdom" would probably be most appropriate, while the motto of John of Salisbury, who criticised Hugh's work, would be different: "education is only an unveiling of rules and the realisation of patterns written in nature". The aim of John's education is a politically engaged life described in his work *Policraticus*, the first political tractate of the Middle Ages, and his aim is the ability to confront a monarch/tyrant assertively.

## 2. Reading as a highlight of the day and the focus of life

In the previous part, the article focused on two fundamental pedagogical works of the 12<sup>th</sup> century. Now the attention will be paid solely on characteristics brought by Hugh's work in the context of reading.

Both mentioned works have a similar basis as Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana*. Hugh draws on Augustine's belief in the ethical component of reading, highlighted in *De Doctrina Christiana*. The first three books of *De Doctrina* discuss Christian education with the aim of interpreting Scripture and its revelation of God's wisdom. While Hugh rarely cites them explicitly, it is their concerns which he is reworking, less for exegetical than for pedagogical purposes (Sweeney 1995, 63). Augustine believes that "all teaching is teaching of either things or signs" (Augustine 1995, 125). All words for Augustine are signs that point to the things they represent, such as the word "sheep" represents the animal. Instruction in the arts helps a student understand unfamiliar signs and therefore the literal meaning of the words of Scripture. A classical liberal arts education, then, must be put at the service of the interpretation of Scripture, the definitive Christian text containing all necessary teaching.

While for Augustine reading means that we learn to understand signs (words and their meaning) and thus only *litteratus* can study, Hugh understands education in a wider scope – as getting to know the signs that surround us, i.e., the world, which is written in a language understood by everyone including an illiterate person, *illiteratus* (Blumenberg 1984, 83). This enables him to progress on the journey of Wisdom, because reading stands at the beginning of Wisdom, as Hugh underlines repeatedly. It is the way of discovering signs in the surrounding world that tell us about God. For Hugh of St Victor, "the entire sense-perceptible world is like a sort of book written by the finger of God. For Hugh and also Alain de Lille, 'in this world of mortal creature shows us life in form and feature' («Omnis mundi creatura/quasi liber et pictura...» (Bloch 1986, 20). Philosophy learned through such an open perception of the world represents an instrument of education; it teaches us how to be friends with God. This is why Hugh sees reading as a highlight of every day, the completion of every activity and the focus of life. He describes the act of reading through various images, mostly from ordinary life.

Hugh focuses on reading mainly in his third book, where he outlines a description of everything that is necessary for reading and introduces fundamental methods (IX–XIX) which could be understood as necessary "attitudes" to reading.

Hugh describes reading as a "bodily, physically demanding activity" that requires action, power, sturdiness and is performed rhythmically, an exercise of breathing and with full attention

of senses. It is no wonder that Hellenic authors compared reading to an energetically consuming ball game or walking. It was an exhausting activity. It required the ability to hold one stable position of the body as well as the involvement of the other senses: hearing, touch, taste. Apart from the phenomenon of reading aloud, which has been used since ancient times for better memorisation (*clara lectio*) (Carr 2010, 110), regular rhythmic breathing was involved, too. Reading of the text aloud transformed a bunch of written signs into a certain “soundtrack” that reached all the senses (Harkins 2012, 274). For this reason, humming monks were called “chewing cows” (*animalia ruminantia*). They chew every word because it was understood as a journey towards Wisdom. However, all of this was a slow activity.

Moreover, in the books inked by scribes, words ran together without any break across every line on every page, in what is now referred to as “scriptura continua”. Readers’ eyes had to move slowly and haltingly across the lines of text, pausing frequently and often backing up to the start of a sentence, as their minds struggled to figure out where one word ended and a new one began and what role each word was playing in the meaning of the sentence. Reading was like working out a puzzle (Carr 2010, 110).

Reading was as exhausting as a walk in the mountains, hard on breathing and the physical condition, which made this activity even more enriching, if the person was open and perceptive. The progress was slow and it was not possible to overtake or skip anything. This perceptive reading did not condemn and repudiate any kind of text, including pagan: “you should hold no knowledge in contempt, because all knowledge is good. You should not disdain at least reading any book (...) since there is no book, in my estimation, that does not set forth something useful if it treats its subjects in an appropriate place and order. Indeed, there is no book that does not also possess something unique...” (Hugh 2012, 128).

This unobstructed journey across a country is like wandering from page to page, and each of them is different. During a journey across a country one gets to know new horizons, and it is the same with reading – every page unveils new continents. Hugh interprets this theory based on etymology. He is convinced – together with Plinius – that the meaning of the Latin word *pagina*, “page”, is also related to “line” (Lat. *pagus*), and the roots of a vine are implanted in those lines. He believed that reading (Lat. *legere* = pick up) is derived from the Latin word *lignum* – “wood” – which is usually picked up in the forest or vineyard to build a fire – and that reading can also be interpreted as a picking – looking for wood to build the fire, picking the letters and sounds that create words where wisdom is hidden (Illich 1996, 58; Nemec 2021, 52).

### 3. Methods of reading

Apart from the fact that in *Didascalicon* Hugh adopts and comments on the rules of reading by Augustine (*De Doctrina Christiana*), he also mentions six methods that should help readers read better and appear to be more interesting to us: 1. a humble mind (*mens humilis*), 2. an enthusiasm for inquiry (*studium quaerendi*), 3. a quiet life (*otia quieta*), 4. scrutiny (*scrutinium tacitum*), 5. frugality (*paupertas*), and 6. in exile (*terra aliena*). This article will briefly touch on only two of them.

There is something that defines all these methods or “attitudes” – a fundamental openness and listening. Sensitive perception, which is supposed to forge from the “outside” to the “inside”, where this reading continues in a form of meditation. These methods support better preparation for a given text, exhorting to adopt attitudes which “mellow the soil” of the reader’s interior and stimulate its growth.

Hugh describes reading as a “strenuous activity”. However, he uses the expression “*otia monastica*” or “*otia quieta*”. Both terms refer to something that is difficult to translate from Latin, but it is the opposite of activity and strenuousness. In a way, both expressions speak about “otiosity, rest, peace, tranquillity”, when we are not involved in any activity (*negotium*), but we have a certain form of “*otium*” (*scholé* – leisure – Pieper 2017, 11). A medieval monk reached out for a book as a yearned moment which followed after a long day of labour.

Hugh refers to the spirit in which this life of reading ought to be lived. He uses the word *vacare*, which says all but cannot be translated well into English. Rufinus (cca. 435–510) was the first to define the monk as someone “who in solitude makes himself free for God alone,” *solus soli Deo vacans* (Illich 1996, 61). *Vacate* means “to have been set or become free.” When Christian authors use the term, the stress is not on the release a person receives, but on the freedom he takes of his own volition.

Hugh thus demands that the reader who desires to reach perfection engage himself in leisure (*otium*). “For it is especially meditation that removes the soul from the din of earthly activities and even in this life gives it a certain foretaste of the sweetness of eternal tranquility.” (*Ea enim maxime est, quae animam terrenorum actuum strepitu segregat, et in hac vita etiam aeternae quietis dulcedinem quodammodo praegustare facit*) (Hugh 2012, 125–126).

Through reading, man breaks free from all burdens. Free from the burden of work, he sees things in a different perspective; he views his prejudices from distance and becomes aware of them, just because he realises how much he does not know yet and how much he can learn from every other human being. According to Hugh, such an openness is the sign of a wise man.

Apart from this, Hugh also mentions another method – silent scrutiny. Although from ancient times people used to read aloud, as we could see, Hugh and Richard were the first supporters of “silent reading”. This fact suggests that Hugh understood it as the most important formative and educational activity. Integral formation starts inside the man, from where he observes and perceives any text. This is because “there is no book, in my estimation, that does not set forth something useful if it treats its subjects in an appropriate place and order. Indeed, there is no book that does not also possess something unique...” (Hugh 2012, 128)

Hugh sees a book not only as a subject that deserves respect, but in his eyes it is literally worth adoration. A book is like a temple with its entrance (introduction), as well as its centre and conclusion (like in the temple where everything is directed towards the tabernacle). Pages of the book are like windows through which people are illuminated by the light that shapes them like in the beginning of the world. Signs and words are the bearers of Wisdom, illustrations and ornaments in the book are metaphors that stimulate and provoke our imagination. According to Hugh, reading a book represents an activity very similar to adoration, but he actually sees it as a crucial process, the process of education which takes place within us during this slow, silent



and “ruminant” reading. It may look like “inaction” at the first sight – like reading – but Hugh believed that in fact something sublime takes place during this activity.

### Conclusion

Due to shortage of space, this article presented only two of Hugh’s methods of reading and outlined several moments of his pedagogy. It seems that Hugh bases the entire formation of man on the correct act of reading – from the moment of preparation to a thorough inner reading that could be described as “ruminant”. The text itself is “creative” (from the word *creatio*) and affects the person only to the extent desired by the reader.

Hugh’s pedagogy has certain interesting aspects even today. In a time of worsening concentration of students, widely spread lack of concentration, when reading became a race and browsing through pages and reflecting has been replaced by scrolling and skimming, it allows us to realise that philosophy and theology clearly contradict this trend, trying to lead students to slow reading with critical distinction.

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# Tempting of Speech in Music Education: Reflections on Thomas Mann's *Doktor Faustus*

Michael Pinkas

## Abstract

The article deals with the temptation of speech in the teaching of music, as highlighted in Thomas Mann's *Doktor Faustus*. Within the framework of the teacher-pupil, pupil-narrator and narrator-reader dialogue in Thomas Mann's *Doktor Faustus*, a new perspective on the perception of music is formed without a single note being played. Words are meant to take us to imagery. Correspondingly, is it possible to talk about the music that exists, to construct ideas logically, but to be distant from the identity of what is heard? Such questions are the basis of the hermeneutic spiral of analysis-interpretation and the subject of teacher-pupil dialogue, where true insight can be born.

## Keywords

Thomas Mann; education; philosophy of education; music theory; composition.

## Introduction

Thomas Mann's *Doktor Faustus* (1943–47) contains inexhaustible suggestions inviting music education or education in general – this novel deals with the life of the fictional composer Adrian Leverkühn (1885–1940), who studied composition and theology in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century.

Complexity of philosophical dialogue is a definitive trait of Faust material – Radim Palouš discussed it in detail with the example of the theatre play *Pokoušení* (1985, Eng. *Temptation*) by Václav Havel. Doctor Foustka (or 'Faust') attempts to bewitch Markéta. This is a situation which takes place at least five levels – (actual) philosophical speech itself, Foustka's intention to acquire something that he desires, the influence and mysterious power over the speech of Fistula (or 'Mephistopheles'), Markéta, who is astonished at the speech, and a spectator who, in her capacity as an actor, perceives this complex whole. (Palouš 2011, 86)

Based on this example, one can even describe the musical education outlined in *Doktor Faustus* at various levels. For starters, one can interpret the description as following the path of the education of Adrian Leverkühn, alias Doktor Faustus. However, the narrative is provided by his friend, the philologist Serenus Zeitblom. As a passionate connoisseur of music and an occasional Viola da Gamba performer, he has attended a number of lectures about music with Leverkühn, and he wanted to broadcast and analyse his friend's music from his own perspective. But, in the background, it is also possible to observe the third level – the private thoughts of Arnold Schönberg and Theodor W. Adorno about contemporary music,

even if they are not quoted in the book. In addition, the speech of Mephistopheles in Chapter 25 is largely based on a quote from Theodor Adorno's *Philosophy of New Music* (1940–47), without mentioning it explicitly. The fourth level represents a musical education of the reader, for the musical terms are often extended with lexical explanations, e.g., 'the double counterpoint' like 'two simultaneous voices, each of which could be upper or lower voice, and this makes them interchangeable.' (Chap. 9) The reader is inconspicuously educated in this way. The final level of education embraces the reader's contemporary thoughts on music pedagogy – the book generates them in the reader's head based on experience and knowledge appropriate to the reader's epoch.

These levels of musical education may be existent not only in a book, but also in the teacher's monologue, or in dialogue with a pupil, for whom recognition of the various levels of conversation, and acknowledging such influences for themselves, is of major significance. Then an attempt is made to exert these influences and thoughts in *Doktor Faustus* from the perspective of music theory and musical pedagogy: 1) The influence of Theodor Adorno and its dialectical conception of music history, 2) the influence of Arnold Schönberg as a teacher, who has been involved with 'arts' and 'crafts' as well as aesthetic categories, 3) the inspiring thoughts on philosophical dialogue originating from the philosopher Radim Palouš and the music theorist Ulrich Kaiser.

### **Dialectical conception of music history**

A music pupil has become accustomed to dialectical comparisons of Johann Sebastian Bach and Georg Friedrich Händel, Richard Wagner and Johannes Brahms, Arnold Schönberg and Igor Stravinsky. This being the situation, these antipodes only partially reveal the truth, but they speak deeply about the ones behind their concepts. The composition students at the University of Music and Performing Arts Vienna, during the first year of their studies, go into more depth studying the *Philosophy of New Music* of Theodor Adorno, which pits two musicians against each other: Schönberg as 'progress' (Adorno 1975, 36) and Stravinsky as 'Regression' (Adorno 1975, 152).

As a lumped-together drawn-up concept: the assembly of Schönberg and Stravinsky presented by Thomas Mann is employed with a composer who has entered into a contract with the devil, i.e., Leverkühn alias Doktor Faustus. This composer has at his disposal a 'strenger Satz' method (inspired by Schönberg) as well as Stravinskyan concepts relating to folk and prehistoric music. Exactly how this synthesis has a stimulating influence on a composer can be seen in music by Alfred Schnittke (1934-1998). The merging of the identities of Stravinsky and Schönberg, the combination of old and new music (polystylism) only became relevant in the second half of the 20th century. For Alfred Schnittke, *Doktor Faustus* became a source of lifelong inspiration, which transferred not only Mann's 'montage' concept, but also the complexity of the various historical forms of the German language present in *Doktor Faustus*, into his music. (Godár 2012, 51–52) Moreover, German composer Hans Werner Henze (1926–2012) writes his *Third Violin Concerto* in 1997 following 'Doktor Faustus', where the violin represents the fate of the individual and the orchestra – his social connections.

Thomas Mann further employed Schönberg's revolutionary idea in another dialectic pair: Wagner-Brahms. Brahms was selected as a more progressive figure, although back in his time this claim was more true of Wagner. However, Schönberg wanted to present Brahms' 'Developing Variation' technique as a precursor to his 'Twelve-Tone Technique' (Schönberg 1989, 33), such that Schönberg himself could be classified in the same category as Beethoven and Brahms in the context of German music history. However, one thing that has remained unmentioned is that Brahms himself (possibly) was able to view this construct only as a 'stupid gimmick and always an indication of the poorest kind of invention'<sup>1</sup> (Brahms 1915, 216) – similar attempts at analysis came from him. The fact that Schönberg is not quoted in Mann's novel could make it harder for the reader to deal with the information in a critical fashion. However, one question that keeps coming up is whether or not a quote which is correct is capable of generating the feeling of a violation of the artistic integrity of the work (see Mann 1949, Chap. III), the likes of which occurred initially at the end of the novel and appeared only in the second edition at the instigation of Schönberg:

It does not seem superfluous to inform the reader that the method of composition presented in Chapter XXII, known as the twelve-tone or row technique, is in truth the intellectual property of a contemporary composer and theoretician, Arnold Schoenberg, and that I have transferred it within a certain imaginary context to the person of an entirely fictitious musician, the tragic hero of my novel. And in general, those parts of this book dealing with music theory are indebted in many details to Schoenberg's *Theory of Harmony*. (Mann, 534)

### **Arts and crafts as aesthetic categories**

The challenge posed by the dialectical perception of music is embodied by the abstract categories which were particularly emphasised in *Doktor Faustus*: 'arts' and 'crafts'. Thomas Mann represents concrete personalities in this way – an 'artistic' French school represented with Jules Massenet (1842–1912) and a German school of 'crafts' with Anton Bruckner (1824–1896). Massenet encouraged his composition students 'to commit to their own production, regardless of whether their technical ability was sufficient to write a flawless sentence'<sup>2</sup> (Chap. 37). On the other hand, with Bruckner, students were required to compose 'the sacred craft and the basic elements of harmony throughout the year, and practice the strict compositional practice method, before their work would be admitted'.<sup>3</sup>

The difference between one's own production/'art' and technical ability/'craft' is very debatable in the modern day. Historical Compositional Practices, such as the Renaissance motets of Palestrina or the baroque chorales and fugues of Bach, need to be taught, preferably as pseudo style copies – only such a fixture could be rated with such pseudo-rules. (Schröder

<sup>1</sup> 'dumme Spielerei und immer ein Zeichen armseligster Erfindung' (Brahms 1915, 216)

<sup>2</sup> 'zu eigener Produktion, ganz gleich, ob ihr technisches Können ausreichte, einen fehlerlosen Satz zu schreiben' (Chap. XXXVII)

<sup>3</sup> 'Jahrelang das heilige Handwerk, die Grundelemente der Harmonie und des strengen Satzes üben, bevor ihnen erlaubt war' zu komponieren. (Chap. XXXVII)

2015, 21) The same applies for simple harmonic exercises. In modern day music pedagogy, ‘crafts’ have an unacceptable function recognised with them, although one could argue not just about the pseudo-rules but also the reasons as to why one is required to imitate the style of concrete composers and not other ones. These questions on the topic of meaning are also related to the stylistic pluralism of postmodern art – if ‘arts’ and ‘crafts’ are no longer as closely associated as they used to be. (Jeßulat 2015, 7) However, in this sense, one can delve further into the subject of the relativity of historical hermeneutics.

In the modern day, the quote from Schönberg’s theory of harmony is also a debatable and amazing one: ‘I eliminated aspects of bad aesthetics from the composition students, but I have given them a good craftsmanship in its place.’<sup>4</sup> (Schönberg 1922, 7) However, ‘good’ craftsmanship (in sense of apprenticeship) can be encumbered only as a result of the generation gap between teachers and pupils, as is implied in *Doktor Faustus*:

Teacher and pupil were essentially quite far apart in matters of musical instinct and intent – indeed, any aspirant in the arts finds himself almost by necessity dependent on the guidance of a master of his craft from whom he is already half-estranged by a generation’s difference. Things only go well if the master nevertheless surmises and understands these hidden tendencies – sees them ironically, if need be – but is careful not to stand in the way of their development. (Mann, 160)<sup>5</sup>

Which of the levels of philosophical dialogue can be present in the teaching of ‘arts’ and ‘crafts’ in music? The dialogue between pupils and teachers resembles the philosophical dialogue between Faust and Markéta, with multifaceted influence levels. The pupil can be in the position of Markéta, who listens to the philosophical speech uncritically enthralled. The risk recognised with Faust-like education is that, as a result, the music educator can be either grounded ‘in a metaphysical, sentimentalist, socio-critical or empiricist teleology’ (Koopal 2020, 103) or ‘would lose h[im]self in seductive tactics, leading the pupils astray by impressing them with h[is] own musical ideas and preferences.’ (Koopal 2020, 110)

### **Tempting of speech in music education**

The discussion between teacher and pupil as the centrepiece of musical education is dependent on the consensus that music expresses the ‘unspoken’, which makes talking about music particularly difficult. Music itself is also ‘ambiguous’, and Leverkühn too acknowledged this in *Doktor Faustus*. (‘That music is ambiguity as a system.’<sup>6</sup>), (Mann 1947, 61) ‘Ambiguity’ in connection not just with discussion about music, but also with musical script, can also lead

<sup>4</sup> ‘Ich habe den Kompositionsschülern eine schlechte Ästhetik genommen, ihnen dafür aber eine gute Handwerkslehre gegeben.’ (Schönberg 1922, 7)

<sup>5</sup> ‘Lehrer und Schüler waren nach ihren musikalischen Instinkten und Willensmeinungen im Grunde recht weit auseinander, wie ja in der Kunst fast notwendig der Strebende sich auf die handwerkliche Führung durch ein generationsmäßig schon halb entfremdetes Meistertum angewiesen sieht. Es ist dann nur gut, wenn dieses die heimlichen Tendenzen der Jugend doch errät und versteht, sie allenfalls ironisiert, aber sich hütet, ihrer Entwicklung im Wege zu sein.’ (Mann 1947, 200)

<sup>6</sup> ‘Daß Musik die Zweideutigkeit ist als System.’ (Mann 1947, 61)

to the thought that concrete sound reality with a performance/‘interpretation’ for the purpose of ‘analysis’ – is more suitable for the job; as is claimed by the contemporary composer Georg Friedrich Haas (\*1953). (Haas 2012, 15) ‘Analyses’ which are based only on musical notation, are capable of highlighting facts which cannot be heard. (Janz 2018, 240) The question of analysis access – whether ‘musical notation’, ‘interpretation’ or ‘analysis’ itself is used for the purpose of talking about music – is also a matter of objectivity (based on musical notation) and subjectivity (based on the sound reality of the ‘interpretation’). Haas’ suggestion is based on the condition that this ratio has been inverted, and that only sound reality can work objectively.<sup>7</sup> Music ‘analyses’ by Thomas Mann, in this case analyses of silent material which constitute a pure product in Thomas Mann’s literary fantasy, play around with the significance of the objectivity/subjectivity pair. And, because such ‘analyses’ cannot be falsified (reading the musical notation and listening to the music are obviously not possible), Mann’s analyses should be viewed as an artistic summary. However, seeing as it is possible to talk about music in such a colourful way as is the case in *Doktor Faustus*, does this mean that such discussion about music amounts to an insurmountable temptation to engage in discussion?

In the dialogue between Faust and Markéta, or Doktor Faustus-Leverkühn and Mephistopheles, or maybe Thomas Mann and the reader, one should differentiate between artistic summary and the truth, as it is with the quotes of Schönberg and Adorno which are explicitly not mentioned in *Doktor Faustus*. The same applies for the art of the dialogue between teacher and pupil, preferably characterised by mutual humble listening. It is always necessary to rediscover a true view, as Radim Palouš states. However, this arises not in a teacher-pupil dialogue; rather, the true insight is born only in the dialogue participants (Palouš 2010, 64) The tradition of Socratic dialogues makes such conversational distance achievable.

From the perspective of music theory, the music theorist Ulrich Kaiser discusses the problems recognised with Socratic dialogues. The teacher asks questions so that the pupil can discover an answer by himself/herself; an answer which the teacher knows is usually required to allow the lesson to progress further, before crafting rules may be shared. A problem will arise if a pupil, by virtue of their creativity or autonomy, refuses an answer, or if the teacher’s body

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<sup>7</sup> This point would require a more elaborate discussion. Haas designed this solution primarily for the analysis of contemporary music, in which a musical score has a number of other possible functions than ever. A musical score can for instance only vaguely suggest a possible sound result (graphic score, aleatory techniques), or it can in certain cases be music itself (computer music, music for mixed tape). The music composer Dieter Schnebel (1930-2018) reached the very limit of the possibilities of interpretation, who published during the budding avant-garde of the 1960s the book-musical score *MO-NO, Music to read* (1969), where music is supposed to be created in silence in the mind of the reader. ‘The reading of the book is intended to stimulate music in the listener’s head, so that in being alone in reading – mono –; one becomes the performer of music, makes music for oneself.’ (Schnebel 1969, Introduction) This concept of inspiring musical scores is very close to that of the illusory narrative of music in *Doktor Faustus*. This has unfathomable consequences for the interpretation of contemporary music and for the contemporary music analysis. The sound reality is different for each listener, so the ideal and objective would be a group analysis as a method introduced by Ralf von Appen (Appen 2015, 3) including cultural and educational background, which could reflect the perception of music of each listener, rather than individual interpretations of brilliant analysts, which can always hide inside the tempting of speech in the intention of own interests.

language is unclear, or if the question lies outside the pupil's capabilities. Kaiser described as an important experience, when the teacher tried only to ask questions in class that he himself did not know before: The teacher then ended up in a situation in which the birth of a new idea or thought could not be ruled out. (Kaiser 2010, 200–201)

This new idea – the new true view emerging in participants in the dialogue – should remain 'unspoken' in the case of musical education, and should ideally be recognisable to composers in their 'compositions' and to performers in their 'interpretations'.

## Conclusion

A reader of the novel *Doktor Faustus* may find themselves bewitched by the colourful representations of non-existent music while at the same time feeling that there is music education taking place. The complexity of the novel *Doktor Faustus*, with the various thoughts of music theorists, makes it particularly hard for the reader to appreciate the true view of things. Another point with a similar meaning: a music teacher who is burdened by various influences may hold a monologue which might impart something other than the speech itself.

On the other hand, discussion about music is something which can stimulate creativity; for example, this was displayed by the composers Schnittke and Henze, who were inspired by *Doktor Faustus* in his compositions, or by the composer Schnebel and his *Mo-No, Music to read*.

The risk of Faust-style tempting of speech is an ever-recurring challenge in music pedagogy or in pedagogy in general, which is essentially based on the teacher-pupil dialogue. It would seem necessary to reinitiate Socratic dialogues, without all the temptation. It is something that, along with Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus*, can resonate extraordinarily with contemporary music theory education.

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# Outline of the Philosophical Concept of the Child and the “Child in us”

Miriam Prokešová

## Abstract

In this article, an outline of the philosophical concept of the child is presented, based on the central idea that our childhood and the child we were is not a thing of the past, but is always present within us, at any age. This “Child in us” is not only our longing for love but is the very love that secretly persists within us. In our lives, we long for this love; we are constantly searching for that ancient “child within us”, mostly without knowing that we are always that child – love.

## Keywords

child; childhood; love; memories; Child in us

## Prolegomena to the philosophical concept of the child

My initial questions and search for answers lie in grasping the concept of philosophy in the contemporary world: I ask whether philosophy is still today, in the words of the ancient philosophers Plato and Aristotle, an astonishment at the incommensurability of the self-evident, whether it is constantly, in the words of M. Heidegger, a responsible response to the being of being, or whether the calculability of nature does not transform human imagination into mere calculating thought, or whether the words of M. Heidegger’s words that philosophy ends and cybernetics begins; whether, in the words of another great, E. Husserl, the *Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* is the result of an errant rationalism; whether it is still possible to perceive philosophy as the art of creation according to Deleuze and Guattari. In my answers, I draw primarily on the conception of J. Patočka and his *Natural World as a philosophical problem*, where the natural world is contrasted with the world of physis, i.e., the world of concepts, understood as a world not acquired by theorising, a world of the pre-conceptual, felt from the moment one is a human being, a world before the discovery of its problematic, where hiddenness is not yet experienced; a natural world where the world is not yet the world of *physis*, i.e., a simplified construction of the natural world. On this basis, I perceive philosophical thinking not only from a positivist, in a way closed point of view which is indeed necessary for grasping concepts, but also from the conviction that philosophy is always also something more; it is an unlimited openness, taking place in the words of J. Patočka in the natural, and not in the mathematically reconstructed world of mathematical natural science... Nor is the concept of the child a given: it is based on Patočka’s conception of the

natural world in contrast to the world of *physis* and can help us to understand ourselves – these are the core axioms of my conception of the child and childhood.

The philosophical reflection on the concept of the child also relates to the philosophical-anthropological concept of man in the sense of Kuhn's and Skolimowski's paradigms – the mythical man – *homo irrationalis*, Logos – *animal rationale* (*zoon logon echon* and *politikon*), Theos – *imago Dei* (*homo viator* and *homo poenitens*), Mechanos – *ego cogitans* as a sublime transcendence and a being with deficiencies or computer man. What I bring here is a new conception of man as a fragile being woven from his sorrows and memories. In my conception I draw not only on the ideas and theses of some great philosophers, but also on my own life experience. I am thus gradually discovering a new concept in philosophy – the philosophy of the “child” within ourselves, the child that we are constantly being and that we are constantly seeking and never ceasing to seek, even in adulthood.

In philosophical anthropology, the concept of man has its irreplaceable place. The concept of the child, however, eludes philosophical grasp. In my essay, I present an outline of the “philosophy of the child” based on the ideas of Plato, J. J. Rousseau, M. Scheler, C. G. Jung, J. Patočka, E. Lévinas, G. Marcel, M. Heidegger and others. I start from the premise that the child is good in itself, it is love, and only in human society, which is not perfect, does the child also become a non-perfect being that needs to be educated.

### **The search for the child**

On the basis of the ideas of the philosophers mentioned above, I will conceptualise the concept of the child first from the historical perspective of the approach to the child (how the child has been perceived in society historically – white, black legend), and I will recall here some statements of the great philosophers about the child and childhood. Overall, I approach the concept of the child in terms of philosophy from seven perspectives, which I have established not only by analysing the ideas of the philosophers, but primarily by analysing and linking these ideas to my own insights, also derived from my own extensive research into and analysis of memoirs.

### **The child is thus a being that is:**

- *ens amans*, a loving being filled with trust (inspired by the philosophy of M. Scheler)
- a being of future sorrow and memories (inspired by S. Freud – essay *Erinnern, Wiederholen, Durcharbeiten*, 1914) – to remember, to repeat, to work
- a being at once abandoned and divinely powerful (inspired by C. G. Jung, *The Psychology of the Child Archetype*)
- Being intentional (inspired by the thesis of E. Husserl – the child is born into a pre-known world, but already with a given intention of love and trust)
- wandering being (a newly arriving being, then a being of three movements according to J. Patočka: acceptance, adaptation, transcendence – the movement of self-determination, defence and truth)

- the invasion of love into the totality of being (inspired by M. Heidegger and his concept of man as an invasion into the totality of being)
- the eternal return and longing for love (inspired by F. Nietzsche)

### **Memories of childhood, the Child in us**

The culmination – the completion – of the philosophical concept of the child and then childhood is the theme based on the analysis of the memories of students of different ages (from 2002–2020).

Memories, understood by their utterance as an “object”, can be analysed into several categories – joyful, painful, dirty, shameful, prophetic, anxious, meditative, joyful and painful at the same time (Dostoyevsky, Hříbková).

On the basis of the analysis of these memories, it turned out that our childhood is not primarily beautiful and joyful, but is associated more with anxious (women) and painful (men) memories. Joyful, beautiful memories are associated with the figures of our grandparents. The happy memories are almost identical in some way, the negative memories are different from each other (we all have different ones).

In the analysis of memories, I rely on the ideas of H. Bergson followed by Deleuze’s *Bergsonism*.

Intuition is an immediate cognition in which we raise a problem, we discover a difference in nature, we perceive real time as duration. It is a method of being problematising (criticising the wrong problems and finding the right ones), differentiating (dividing and re-intersecting), and temporalising (thinking in terms of duration). In his method of intuition, Bergson distinguishes qualitative and continuous multiplicity as opposed to quantitative or numerical multiplicity. Qualitative multiplicity focuses on the subject and subjectivity. This multiplicity is characterised by three properties: continuity, heterogeneity and simplicity. Bergson further speaks of two forms of negativity: the negativity of simple limitation and the negativity of contradiction. For research in pedagogy (or philosophy), it is necessary to note that consciousness, which remembers moments of external things (events), thus actualises a purely temporal, i.e., no longer spatial, dimension. Qualitative multiplicity reveals the subjective (duration) in continuity, heterogeneity and simplicity; it does not lean towards the present, so it refers neither to the psychological experience of duration nor to the physical experience of movement – duration is an extended (transcended) condition of experience.

This method could be used, for example, to process memories which are not understood as something that was in the past, but instead as something that alone (the present cannot be captured) is constantly “present” in us. The “child in us” is thus not a memory of what has already been, even though it cannot be a memory; it is what is always present in us and what is always ongoing.

Man is a very fragile being, woven of his sorrows and memories.

### The Child in us as:

- a mystery, like the veil of the mythical dancer Maya. The child is lost in the depths of our interior, only occasionally surfacing, it is an *alétheia* – an uncovering, an immanent plane in the chaos
- abyss of abysses, as a liminal situation, an event, a hypostasis: our self is in the depths of the abysses of eternity and nothingness – encountering the infinite emptiness of our own abysses somewhere in the far unknowable depths of ourselves, in the deep mysteries surrounding what and who we are
- a being on a journey, through Mythos (*homo irrationalis*), Logos (*animal rationale*), Theos (*homo viator* and *homo poenitens*), Mechanos (*ego cogitans*)
- Love and loneliness, facing the other... our childhood is not created by ourselves, but by other people
- a landscape of memories

### In conclusion

#### Who is the “Child in us”?

The “child in us” is a mystery, an illuminated and unenlightened part of our personality.

It is the abyss of the abyss within ourselves, the nothingness and the eternity, it is our own event. It is not something that once was, it is not a mere past, but is that which is constantly acting and being.

The “child in us” is our presence and our solitude, our love and our illusion. It is what we are constantly seeking within ourselves in the form of our longing for love, and it is also our longing for the intrinsically joyful love of our childhood.

The “child in us” is not only love, but also a return to love. And not only that, it is a return to the beginnings of our life, which will one day be consummated by death and transformed.

The child is all that is within us, our beginning and our end, our past, present and future.

It is the love we encounter in our lives and that we will all meet one day.

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# Why Death Should Be a Topic for Education

Mária Spišiaková

## Abstract

Although the Covid-19 pandemic has reintroduced death and dying into awareness and debate, these topics remain in some sense taboo in society. From a philosophical perspective, however, death is closely related to the meaning of life and it is therefore unavoidable to reflect on it. The article attempts to show that reflections on death should be a part of education at different levels.

## Keywords

death; education; meaning of life; relationships; love

In the first edition of the Winter School of Philosophy of Education 2021, I wanted to show the usefulness of philosophical reflection on the problem of evil and the meaning of suffering in human life. These are not very popular topics in today's society because its main actors seek to convince people that all suffering, even death, can either be eliminated or at least "controlled". Therefore, death is often perceived as a "pathology" (Šiklová 2013, 12), as a "stranger" or an "enemy" (Kreeft 2012, 19 and 45) that must be fought to the last moment and kept as far away from us and out of our sight. However, in philosophical reflections death plays an important role with regard to meaningful human life, and it is therefore necessary to deal with it. In this article, I would like to point out that reflections about death – as well as about suffering – should be a part of education and self-education.

The human being is the only animal that is aware of the necessity of his own death. In the long history of mankind, death has not only been the antithesis of life, but a natural part of it. People have encountered it almost daily, not only in times of wars or epidemics, but also in everyday life when loved ones have died, and even the children have been present not only at the funeral and final farewell to them, but also at the washing and dressing of the deceased. Although death has always evoked fear, especially because of its association with suffering and helplessness, people were not afraid to talk about it, to prepare for it, whether by writing a testament, or choosing a burial place or details of their own funeral. Believers prayed that God would keep them "from an unexpected death", not to die unprepared for the passage to eternal life. Some monks had a motto *memento mori* (remember that you [have to] die) and the faithful were reminded at the beginning of the Lent: "Remember you are dust, and to dust you shall return". According to several thinkers, the proximity of death and the awareness of the temporality of life allow us to appreciate life more, to live the present moment more fully and authentically. Death "makes life precious" (Kreeft 2012, 85).



But nowadays, in our Western culture, death is a taboo. As Umberto Eco aptly describes, it fades from our view and we push it out of our minds, even though the media are often full of it. The young generation is experiencing “that death takes place far away from us in a hospital, that people usually don’t walk behind the coffin to the cemetery, that we no longer see the dead” (Eco 2017, 168). But on the other hand, they “see them constantly blown up, crashed on the sidewalk, dropped into the sea with their feet in a cube of cement, their heads left rolling on the cobbles, their brains splattered over the windows of taxis. But they are not us and they are not our loved ones; they are actors. Death is entertainment, even when the media reports about the girl actually raped or the victim of a serial killer” (Eco 2017, 168).

In this situation the global pandemic of Covid-19 came as a shock because a lot of people had never experienced death so closely before. And so Eco’s almost prophetic words were confirmed: “And so the disappearance of the death from our immediate experience will terrify us more when the moment approaches – the event that is part of us from birth, and to which every wise person grows accustomed throughout life” (Eco 2017, 169).

If education is understood as a lifelong process preparing a person not only for a particular profession, but for life in all its complexity, then surely death education has its place in it. Its aim should be not only to help people to cope with the loss of their loved ones, but above all to adopt the right attitude towards their own death: because a human, through his attitude towards death can co-determine what death, and through it the whole of reality, will appear to him (Marcel 2013, 224).

### **Different attitudes toward death**

Although one intuitively knows that one will die (Scheler 1971, 145), one can repress the thought of death. Some people can adopt a more or less negative attitude towards death, seeing death as an enemy, a stranger, a pathology or a punishment. Others can view it in a more positive way, as “a friend” that delivers them from unbearable suffering. This attitude towards death is held by advocates of suicide (Bullová 2015, 145) or euthanasia. Death can also be a heroic act, a sacrifice of one’s life for someone or for some ideal, for homeland, for freedom, for faith. In this case, however, death is not understood as something positive, but on the contrary life is perceived as something very precious that one is willing to give up in favour of an even higher value.

Death in old age, after having lived a meaningful life filled with relationships of love and friendship, can be seen as the natural conclusion of one’s life journey. E. Kübler-Ross points out that attitudes towards one’s own death do not depend so much on age as on the meaningfulness of one’s life: “Many people believe that death is a welcome friend to most elderly people. This is only partially true. Old age is not synonymous with being ‘glad to die’. Many of these old patients who welcome death may not be in a stage of acceptance, but rather one of resignation, when life is no longer meaningful” (Kübler-Ross 1997, 107).

Attitudes towards issues related to death and dying among the general and professional public in the Czech Republic were surveyed in public opinion polls conducted in 2011, 2013 and 2015 by STEM/MARK in cooperation with the home hospice Cesta domů. In these surveys, 68% of

respondents answered “definitely not” or “rather not” when asked whether end-of-life and dying are sufficiently discussed within society (STEM/MARK, Cesta domů 2015). Although people declare that they are thinking about what kind of care they envision at the end of life, they mostly do not discuss this with anyone (64%). More than one half of respondents (61%) find it difficult to talk about death because of worry and fear (84%) and many think the topic is neglected in families (59%). On the contrary, health professionals (88%) believe that death and dying need to be talked about, even by children, and even as early as preschool age (STEM/MARK 2011).

In 2021, at the time of a global pandemic that claimed the lives of over 6 million individuals, an excellent probe into the thinking of the current middle-aged generation and elderly people (many of whom have already passed the age of 80) was published in the book *Without fear of death (Pro smrt uděláno*, M. Plzák and L. Vopálenská 2021), featuring interviews about death with people of various professions – a Catholic bishop, an evangelical clergyman and a rabbi, philosophers, people working with the dying, a poet, a painter, a soldier, a biologist, etc. The variety of respondents brings a diversity of views that represent a range of approaches to death. However, most of the interviews are united by the view that the proximity of death brings the person to a deeper appreciation of relationships, to look back on his or her life and to try to find positive value in it. Although some were particularly reluctant to talk about attitudes to their own death and their views on existence after death, they admitted that they were dealing with this topic, whether in the context of the ongoing global pandemic or the dying of their loved ones.

The main reason why people do not want to think about death and to meet the dying is the fear of the suffering that accompanies dying. Much has already been done in the practical field of care – at least in some countries.<sup>1</sup> There are also Czech and Slovak websites that are very helpful for both professionals and lay people in dealing with issues related to dying and death.<sup>2</sup> However, this cannot completely remove the taboo of death. Although several books have been published in recent years – either translations of foreign books or books by Czech and Slovak authors who have experience of caring for the dying (e.g., M. Svatošová, J. Šiklová, M. Kašparů, K. Křižanová, M. Hatoková) – a systematic death education is still absent in the Slovak Republic. In Christian formation, too, death is no longer spoken of as much as it once was, and the hope of resurrection (Hahn 2021, 14-15), which once helped man to overcome his fear of death and gave meaning to his life, has disappeared from homilies and from our consciousness.

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<sup>1</sup> For example, the Open Society Institute launched in 1994 the Project on Death in America (PDIA) with a goal to help transform the experience of dying in the United States, that supported initiatives in professional and public education, the arts and humanities, research, clinical care, and public policy, and so helped improve care of the dying.

<https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/project-death-america-grantees-1994-2003>

<sup>2</sup> Information and consultancy sites with practical information for those dealing with death and dying:

<https://www.umirani.cz>, <https://www.zomieranie.sk>

<https://tape.academy>

### What is death education

One of the main promoters of death education is Hannelore Wass,<sup>3</sup> who describes it as follows: “The term *death education* refers to a variety of educational activities and experiences related to death and embraces such core topics as meanings and attitudes toward death, processes of dying and bereavement, and care for people affected by death” (Wass, 2022). This may be formal education in the form of academic programmes and clinical experiences, courses, or courses included in larger units, that may take place at different levels of education. The target audience for formal education is primarily health professionals (doctors and nurses), psychological counsellors, but also children in primary and secondary schools. Informal education happens when certain life experiences (e.g., the death of a relative, a child’s friend) are used as “teachable moments” in which we answer the child’s questions related to that experience.

Formal education should be comprehensive, i.e., it should include not only the theoretical but also the practical part. In secondary and higher education, it could consist, for example, of volunteer activities aimed at service to the elderly or terminally ill. Contact with these people can stimulate conversations and raise questions not only about good death, but also about the meaning and the most important values of life. This is evidenced by many who come into contact with the dying as part of their profession, but also by volunteers in the hospital Covid wards during the pandemic (Král’ 2021). They testify to the fact that proximity of death can bring enrichment, more intensive experience of life, a reassessment of one’s priorities and an appreciation of the present moment (Šiklová 2013, 27).

The physician Viola Svobodová describes her many years of hospice work as a school of listening and compassion: “In no other school do we learn how to cope with our own death and the deaths of loved ones” (Svobodová 2021, 153). She said that this work has changed her life, and she takes it as a gift that she appreciates very much. The close relationship with terminally ill patients who are humble, reject deception, and want to know the truth leads to “asking questions about how we would stand in similar situations, what really matters to us, what the priorities are in our lives, etc.” (Svobodová 2021, 153). Many of them in the face of death realize that the most important thing is to mend relationships – to make peace with other people, with God, with one’s own death, and to forgive oneself. One of hospice volunteers affirms: “Dying associated with suffering and existential anguish has a profound meaning that takes place in inner conversion” (Kania in Svobodová 2021, 135). This is the reason why hospices and other places where people are experiencing the proximity of death can also be seen as places

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<sup>3</sup> The professional concerns of Hannelore Wass centre around children’s and adolescents’ encounters with death, including dying, grieving, suicide, lethal violence, and the portrayal of death in entertainment media. She promoted clinical and educational programmes designed to prepare professionals and parents to help children and adolescents cope with these encounters and to transcend them. Hannelore advocated for integrating the subjects of death, grief, suicide, as well as violence prevention and integration into school curricula. Dr Wass published ten books, and over 100 articles and contributing chapters. (<https://forestmeadowsfh.com/obituaries/hannelore-wass/>)

where interpersonal relationships can mature and where the original meaning of such human words as truth, love, honour, trust and respect can be restored (Svobodová 2021, 156).

A theoretical part of death education should offer orientation for reflection about death from the universal human perspective. Therefore, the answers of the Christian faith to the questions of life after death will be left aside, although they are relevant to many people. I will outline just a few philosophical thoughts that may indicate the direction of thinking that can be helpful in dealing with death. Theoretical knowledge focused on the medical aspects of dying, specific medical or psychological assistance to the dying which is part of the field called thanatology will be left aside. But it can appropriately complement death education focused primarily on existential meaning of death.

A number of philosophers and scholars have dealt with the subject of death and reflected the experiences with the dying.<sup>4</sup> Some of them consider reflections on death as an isolated phenomenon or as a fact of my own death, overly reductive and unsatisfactory. Such an approach overlooks the relational nature of the human being, which means that death is always associated with the rupture of relationships. When someone close to me dies it's as if I myself have died but at the same time this beloved still exists in some way. That is why E. Fink considers death to be a "social phenomenon" and the human being as co-existing. The fundamental phenomenon of human life is love, and death is co-existential with love. So for a full understanding of death it is necessary to consider both aspects of death – one's own death and the death of the other (Jedličková 2018).

Also G. Marcel sees the death of a loved one as the key experience in which we anticipate our own death. He speaks about intersubjectivity, a relationship of true love that enables two persons to exist as one "we". In such an "oblative love" they transcend the categories of objectivity and arrive at an open space where "such ways of connection, the presence of the absent, are possible, which objectifying thought does not know, but which are nevertheless accessible to interpersonal experience" (Scherer 2005, 103). The hope of overcoming death thus involves the indestructibility of the mutual bond rather than the indestructibility of an "object" (Marcel 2013, 570). Marcel writes: "Where love endures, where it triumphs over everything that tends to its degradation, death must ultimately and definitively be defeated" (Marcel 1998, 91). In a similar way, also other philosophers affirm a relationship between love and death. When someone loves for no other reason than the love itself, he found in it the meaning of life and already lives "eternity", according to Matušík (Gál, Jurštáková and Matušík 2021, 121).

There are other deeper philosophical justifications for the positive significance of reflection on death and the possibility of transcending it, but due to the limited scope of this article we will not address them.

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<sup>4</sup> For example, an excellent book of Irvin and Marilyn Yalom: *A Matter of Death and Life* (2021) offers us a rare window into facing mortality and coping with the loss of one's beloved from a famous psychiatrist and his wife.

<https://tape.academy>

## Conclusion

In this short essay I have tried to justify the need for death education not only for health professionals but for all, because death is a key phenomenon for meaningful human life. From this brief outline of ideas, which needs to be further developed, it follows that death education must not be only about death and dying, but should include relational education, stressing the importance of deep interpersonal relationships, that of love. These are not only prerequisites for a good death, but also for a meaningful life, for understanding the other person and recognising his or her unique value as a subject that cannot be destroyed by death. The result of such an education is then more than just the right attitude towards death and human finitude. It can also help to bring hope into life, to live more authentically and intensively the present moment and to pay due attention to relationships – to oneself, to others, even to God. It turns out that a meaningful life – which is the main precondition for a good death – depends precisely on the ability to love, to forgive and to find reconciliation. And so death does not have to be an event that robs us of our life, of our freedom to do something, but quite the contrary. An attitude towards death may be the most important expression of our freedom and a good death can be a peaceful conclusion of one's life, or even the beginning of some new existence.

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## Translation

# Radim Palouš on Perception as Belonging

Palouš, Radim. 2010. *Filosofická reflexe několika pojmů školské pedagogiky* (Philosophical reflection on several concepts of schooling pedagogy). Praha: Karolinum, pp. 69–71.

We are buried in a modern tradition. We seek things that are, such as objects, items, imaginations. How else may we find them! We place that which is “available” before ourselves like that which stands across from us and across this we pull ourselves, to the imaginative. This imagining that objectifies essence and, in doing so, lends things a “seal of being,” is a characteristic of modern-age metaphysics; it is subjectivism, it is self-assertion, it is “Ego” – the centre and recourse, it is a will longing for ruling. It is this will that predestines the manner in which the world is allowed to appear to us, namely in the form of objectification. Objects may be handled in such a way that (a) will discover space for its own development. **To overcome this metaphysics means to ontologically overcome subjectivism** and turn to (a) being itself, not however, as to a dimension given by the coordinates of subject-object. An important regard of this term is human openness to the world.

“Pure” staring (*vision*) is fiction. It is expected that everything inside is silent. It is as if it were about a total receptiveness, which is only an optical function of a blind photographic apparatus (regardless of the fact that a certain projection is attributed to that which has been seen). Pure staring could be more likely to mean a demand on the one staring not to insist on a given perspective and open up to suspected and unsuspected perspectives. **Henceforth, purity means that the one staring, “belonging”, is ready to sweep all already prepared perspectives in favour of other possible ones, hence “to belong” to them, not to none.**

The relatively long addiction of an infant on an educator is truly very important for the human ability to perceive. A person is born very much incomplete. The eyes remain loose, they are not overly captivated by instincts or pressure of self-preservation so their legacy does not exceed elementary needs. Since the dawn of time, animals have been too captivated by events in their surroundings. Their attention is depleted by a lurking anticipation of danger, nourishment, etc., simply an anticipation of what an animal is as such. From birth, a human’s belonging is open for the world especially thanks to mal-equipment, incompleteness, boundness: for a long enough time a child cannot independently behave regarding self-preservation. Yes, similarly to other species, it builds its opinion on its surroundings by looking out for functional phenomena – due to its basic instincts. However, human perception is “belonging”, it has the ability to step out of confinement into a certain register of schemes. A person also has various inherited behavioural traits, but not to the extent to which it dominates with animals. Before it is made

applicable by thought, human sight perceives a lot of events that are meaningless, mysterious. It asks for their meaning. A question creeps into staring. In doing so it leaves an autonomously functioning surrounding – and steps into the world of human “opinion”.

This open seeing has a chance of fulfilling itself not only with prefabricates, which ease our functioning by the mechanization of activity, but also has the chance to become the intention of attention, which self-forgettingly pulls towards perception itself, and accepts it with neither defence nor limitation, leaving it if possible to itself.

Attention can be forced either by the world and the things in it or by the focus of him who stares. Humanly, the most significant is the middle ground, where neither things nor the ones staring impose themselves. An experience of this nature is the meeting of looks between a child and a loving mother. It is a moment when the behaviour of the child is not filled with instinct and when the meeting is one of mutual openness (“you perceive me, therefore I am”).

Staring is a process of maturing which is increasingly dependent on behaviour. The more it serves, the less it “belongs” to that at which it stares. The seen “occurring” world is pulled into human purposes; things become “at disposal”. Speech gives meaning to that which has been perceived and easily can accommodate a tendency to be finished with ones surrounding. To name a previously perceived thing means to know it and to know it in a certain way. That is how a person deals with a provocative uncertainty of meaningless things, which then means that the amount of things attracting attention decreases, so it is increasingly determined by the interests of the one perceiving (by his “opinion”), by that which is important to him, what HE means. The field of view, in which things primarily have announced themselves individually, changes into a field of objects for a person. They then sort them into objects of current attention according to subjective living arrangements, and into that which is “there” as well, but does not currently require immediate attention.

This is how a person is wired and overcoming such an enclosure cannot be done by simply scratching implemented mechanisms. An opening is possible only by overcoming these. Belonging can be carried by effort not only to see an object as it is in the interest of him who perceives (it is impossible to be fully rid of subjectivity), as it may be accepted only as one point of view, one of the perspectives, which enables space for other angles and perspectives. This way perceiving is open to the full extent of what the object itself is for perceiving, which overcomes the current “subjective” opinion.

However, it cannot be imagined that an opening viewing would abstract from “this here” in such a way as to gain “objectivity”, a sort of “clear” picture of the world, a world “about itself”. That would not mean anything other than looking out with a sort of unconscious seeing, perceiving without perspective, a complete breaking free from a situation in which a person always is.

Viewing is always knowing. A participation of knowing which has previously been established cannot be determined generally, because knowing itself enters the game during an opening: boundaries are overcome, of not only that which is at our disposal (and that due to dissatisfaction), but also of heralds of things and the world. He who perceives makes his eyes an organ of that which is shown to him in his perception.



Perceiving is an act of an entire personality. Human sight is not only an irritation of a retina by light stimuli, but observation, in which is an entire activity of the perceiver, his acts – actions. If one detaches objects from their environment, then they do so due to their subjectivity. It is impossible to be rid of activity, it would not be human sight. However, it is possible to put this activity into the service of things and the world.

If that is the case then human education does not only take place there, where perceiving is already present. Not only the “inner” is then educated, not only that which a person thinks of what has been seen, but even that which a person sees at all, what a person is able to perceive.

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# Colophon

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